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Embodied Cognition and Emergent Decision-Making in
Dynamical Movement Systems
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is to overview research on decision-making skills and to consider the
whole decision-making process as an integral part of goal-directed behaviour influenced by
bodily constraints at the scale of the environment-athlete relationship. In this article we propose
how dynamical systems theory applied to human movement helps us to understand how
embodied cognition influences decision-making. We use the context of sport in order to
illustrate how decision-making emerges from dynamical movement systems. In traditional
information processing approaches to decision-making, humans have been modelled as
rational decision makers selecting options according to mental models of the world designed
to maximise utility for performance in contexts such as sport and work.1   Traditional approaches
focus on the mental level of human behaviour and brought about significant advances in
comprehending decision-making behaviour. This body of work also exhibited limitations for
understanding decision-making processes, stimulating questions over alternative approaches.
Some alternative views have emerged from ecological psychology and dynamical systems
theory, emphasising human movement systems (i.e. the body) as dynamical systems, surmising
that decision-making does not exclusively arise from mental models of the world. Rather,
decision-making behaviour is considered at the level of the performer-environment relationship
and is seen to emerge from the interaction of individuals with different tasks and environmental
constraints over time. We propose how dynamical systems theory applied to human movement
helps us to understand how embodied cognition influences decision-making. We use the
context of sport in order to illustrate how decision-making emerges from dynamical movement
systems. We examine explanations of the decision-making process in sport as a symmetry-
breaking process within complex, dynamical systems formed by the athlete and the
environment.
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SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF DYNAMICAL MOVEMENT SYSTEMS
As recently noted,2  human movement systems can be considered as dynamical systems
composed of many interacting parts. A systems view of human behaviour is espoused, and
the core ideas behind a dynamical systems perspective include: (i) the concept of state space
(i.e., the hypothetical totality of all the possible states of order (in other words, states of
coordination which are achievable by a movement system); (ii) the idea of a set of possible
trajectories that a movement system can take through state space; and (iii), the use of
mathematics to describe the laws that determine the shapes of these movement system
trajectories.
With respect to the theme of this issue of Junctures, what makes a dynamical systems
interpretation of human movement behaviour attractive is its capacity to transcend brain/
body/environment boundaries. Emergent cognitive phenomena are rooted in factors that
spread across an individual performer (e.g., an athlete’s body and his or her environment).
Such an explanatory framework is suitable for modelling parameters related to both the
individual performer and the environment in a uniform vocabulary and framework, thus
facilitating an understanding of the complex interactions between the two. Whereas the
traditional framework is geared to describing computation and representation as a result of
a mental model of the world, invoking criticisms of agency in biological systems, dynamical
systems theoretical constructs apply as easily to environmental features and individual
movement systems.
The traditional rational approach is the result of many years of scholarly activity, and is, by
any standard, a major intellectual achievement. Because it is the dominant paradigm on
decision-making in psychology, challengers are required to offer a great deal before criticisms
and alternative views are taken seriously. In this article, we will not review traditional
approaches to decision-making. Recent reviews can be found in Mellers, Schwartz, and Cooke3
and Williams, Davids and Williams.4   In the following sections of this article it will become
clear that it seems necessary to include in the study of decision-making in sports: (1) emergent
situations evolving in time showing interdependency between performers; (2) interrelated
decisions analysed at the level of the person-environment system, expressed by emergent
whole-body behaviours in the form of perception-movement cycles; and (3), the capacity to
explain how expertise effects influence decision-making. Specifically, it is important to consider,
not just stored knowledge about action as constraint, but action itself as part of a continuous
dynamic process in the athlete-environment relationship.
DECISION-MAKING AS AN EMERGENT PROCESS IN DYNAMICAL MOVEMENT SYSTEMS
Whereas traditional psychological theories have emphasised essentially individual
psychological constraints for understanding decision-making as a normative rational process,
skilled behaviour from an ecological perspective consists of intentional adaptation to the
constraints imposed by the environment during task performance.5  The influential work of
Kugler and Turvey6  drew attention to the role of information in guiding action, as originally
argued by Gibson,7  but went further in modelling how human action is constrained by laws of
non-equilibrium thermodynamics and non-linear dynamics.
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From this perspective, the role of cognitions and intentions is viewed as “setting up self-
assembly (i.e., leading to the emergence of self-organized behaviour), not explicitly controlling
such processes during movement coordination.”8  Thus, cognitive processes constrain but
are not mandatory for intentional behaviour. Intentions in humans are based in the real world
and are constrained by mind, body, social, and biological contexts. This constraints-led
perspective “promotes functional behaviours such as formative creativity and exploration in
movement systems during learning, and helps avoid stereotypical, unvarying responses that
are maladaptive during goal-directed behaviour.” 9
With regards to the theme of this issue of Junctures, it is somewhat misleading to refer to the
generation of a willed action as if intentional behaviour could exist separate from an
environment, or separate from a body. It makes little sense to propose such a hierarchical
relationship between intentions and actions because it is not possible to separate the influence
on movement system behaviour from the embodiment of perception, action, and cognition.10
To intend a goal (i.e., a final condition) means that the performer selects the initial condition
that permits attainment of the specified final condition under the existing (physical) law domain.
With each step closer to the goal the information must become ever more specific, narrowing
the possible action paths, until ultimately, at the last moment of goal accomplishment, the
path becomes uniquely defined.11  “These decisions emerge from the system depending on
fluctuations in the initial task conditions and any higher-order goals impinging on action.”12
This idea implies that decision-making and intentional action is influenced by the
instantaneous constraints impinging on the movement system, which in turn is constrained
by intentions.
In order to achieve a movement goal, non-linear behaviour will result if there is a competition
between attractors in a dynamical movement system (i.e., if there are multiple sub-goals to
be satisfied). Given this view, decision-making can be defined as a choice among converging
trajectories for an intended goal. This choice is made at a bifurcation point where there is not
enough information to specify the most functional trajectory for the dynamical movement
system. Consider the example of dribbling in ball games like basketball or hockey. The player-
environment system that is established during dribbling can facilitate our understanding of
how selected actions that emerge from a specific player-environment relationship can
contribute to achievement of an intended goal.
INTRINSIC METRICS IN DECISION-MAKING
In ecological psychology, information is a physical variable available in the environment.13  To
detect such information the performer perceives properties of the environment not in extrinsic
units (such as metres, inches, etc.), but scaled in relation to his or her body or body parts,
own action capabilities, and relative in location to other important objects, surfaces and
people in the environment.14   Such an approach to perception and decision-making captures
how important the concept of embodied cognition is in analysing human behaviour.
For example, evidence has shown that the ‘climbability’ of a stair is perceived relative to the
scale of an individual’s leg length. Warren found that young adults of a wide range of statures
could, by visual inspection alone, determine which in a series of stairs of varied riser heights
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afforded bi-pedal climbing and which was most energy efficient.15  This study showed that the
affordance (i.e., action possibility) of a particular stair for an individual can be described as a
function of the riser height (RH) of a stair and the leg length (LEGL) of the perceiver:
π = RH/LEGL. The perceived critical point at which riser height no longer afforded upright
locomotion was stable at 0.88-0.89 of leg length. At this point, climbers were unable to ascend
the stair bi-pedally and a ‘phase transition’ (sudden change) in behaviour occurred. On the
other hand, a ratio smaller than the reported critical ratio specifies climbability of stairs for
an individual. In this experiment, Ulrich, Thelen and Niles16  noted that: “Individual choices
varied but were body-scaled; subjects’ choices were the same mathematical function of the
leg length, regardless of stature” (our emphasis). Therefore, as van der Kamp, Savelsbergh
and Davis17  argued, “body-scaled ratios can be used as a critical determinant of action choice
– a change beyond the critical ratio value demands a new class of action.”
It is the area of transition rather than the critical ratio that is of greatest importance.
Furthermore, contrary to the traditional cognitive approach, van der Kamp (et al.) highlighted
that switching between movement patterns emerges from changes in the constraints imposed
upon action.18  From this perspective, it becomes apparent that individuals do not engage in
conscious and rational mental calculations, comparing the current limb-obstacle ratios with
an internal representation of a critical ratio, and deciding on the basis of this comparison
which action to execute. In order to develop our arguments, we next explore how decision-
making may be considered an emergent process under constraint due to self-organisation
processes in individual movement systems.
ACTION SELF-ORGANISATION
To summarise so far, we have argued that actions, inherently goal directed, are embedded in
specific performance contexts, and embodied in each individual performer’s movement
system. Action may be conceived, according to Kugler and Turvey, as being not something
abstract (a “thing”), but a relation between the individual and the surround, when he or she
is performing a task.19  An action is functionally specific, implying that it needs to be understood
in relation to a function to be achieved in the environment. Also, an action is a specific mode
of resource use, where these resources can emerge from the person (e.g., height, velocity,
impulsivity) or from the environment (e.g., adherent floor, jumpable obstacle). Thus an action
is not an aggregation of anatomic mechanisms, because complex biological systems exhibit
the capacity for stable and unstable patterned relationships to emerge between system parts
through self-organisation.20   As Kelso argued: “A spontaneous pattern formation is self-
organization: the system organizes itself, but there is no ‘self’, no agent inside the system
doing the organizing.”21
Using the previous example of stair climbability, at the point of bifurcation (i.e., the critical
ratio) the probability of using bi-pedal and quadrupedal locomotion is the same. An accidental
fluctuation or perturbation to the system constrains the decision to use one or the other
mode of locomotion, so no agent inside the person-stairs system ‘decides’ which mode to
use. “Certainly, a decision appears to be made, but no decision maker tells what to do.”22
Bifurcations show how open systems (e.g., biological systems which are sensitive to energy
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exchanges with the surrounding environment) often have several options for particular
environmental conditions. This theoretical approach shows how agency can be avoided in
explanations of decision-making in biological systems. For example, when an athlete is running
to gain possession of a ball in soccer, and suddenly slips, self-organised inter-limb coordination
can occur, to compensate for the effects of gravity, and to re-equilibrate the performer to the
vertical position. In non-linear dynamical systems, re-organisation can occur in several
functionally appropriate ways and, in the case of a falling soccer player, there is no need for
recourse to a mental plan to re-equilibrate. Furthermore, self-organisation in biological systems
implies some requisites such as equilibrium and non-equilibrium attractors, as we are about
to discuss.
ATTRACTORS AND SYSTEM ORGANISATION
Non-linear dynamics is a branch of physics that deals with the formal treatment of any system
which is continually evolving over time, and which can, therefore, be formally modelled as a
numerical system with its own equations of motion.23   Within this framework, as we noted
earlier, the behaviour of any living system can be plotted as a trajectory in a state space. We
need to recall here that the state space is the set of all states attainable by the system,
together with the paths to them. The resting states of the system are referred to as equilibrium
points or attractors, as we noted earlier. A physical system can have one or more attractors,
and it is the number and layout of these attractors that influence the overall functioning and
behaviour of the system.24   In the human movement system, attractors are roughly equivalent
to functional states of coordination between the system components or degrees of freedom.25
Self-organisation processes refer to the dynamics of open systems that intrinsically and
autonomously create and annihilate equilibrium points (i.e., attractors). Under appropriate
conditions it appears that such systems can switch and become oriented towards a well-
defined non-equilibrium state, resistant to perturbations.26   For example, in team ball sports,
when a strategic pattern of play of the team is well rehearsed, the initiation of a recognised
link between two players will trigger a combination play in the whole team, i.e., the system will
more easily fall into a stable, non-equilibrium attractor.
Transitions between states of organisation (known as order-order transitions) occur at the
timescale of perception and action and are exemplified through the interactions between
athletes and the environment. These interactions initiate the trajectories from one marginally
stable dynamic mode to another, forming the basis of decision-making to select appropriate
coordination modes in athletes. Structurally stable states of ordered behaviour (i.e., attractors)
are created or annihilated in association with variations in the perceptual field allowing the
performer to switch to different stable modes of behaviour. This capacity to be sensitive to
environmental constraints (as we stated earlier, typical of an open, biological system) fits
with the emergence of order in a dynamical movement system and underpins successful
decision-making in complex environments.27
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CONSTRAINTS ON MOVEMENT SYSTEMS
The role of constraints in channelling motor behaviour became prominent in the last two
decades because it was realised that the stability of functional co-ordination patterns can be
altered by constraints imposed on performers, such as the nature of the information available
to channel movement dynamics, and the structural organisation of the performance
environment including intentions and instructions to act.28
In order to understand the role of constraints in a theoretical explanation of skilled behaviour
in sport, one needs to understand the relationship between stability and flexibility in the
behaviour of natural dynamical systems. As we noted earlier, the learner in sport may be
conceptualised as a dynamical movement system searching for stable and functional states
of coordination (or ‘attractors’) during goal-directed activity.29   The term ‘functional’ in this
description signifies a pattern of behaviour that will support the performer in achieving a
specific task goal such as to score a goal. Dynamical systems can evolve along different
pathways, primarily because they are ‘open’ systems, meaning that their form can be
influenced by many factors in the environment. In studying open, dynamical systems it has
become clear that the influences that guide the form emerging from the system should be
considered as constraints on system behaviour.30
From a constraints-led perspective, skill acquisition may be viewed as a process of stabilising
a functionally appropriate attractor that a movement system can settle into during task
performance. That is, a state of coordination emerges which is relatively resistant to the
environmental forces or constraints that might perturb the stability of the motor system during
goal-directed activity. Therefore, learning is a process in which athletes search for specific,
functional coordination states, that they assemble and stabilise over extended periods of
time. Athletes typically develop a repertoire or landscape of stable, functional attractors to
satisfy the constraints of complex environments. According to Newell, constraints can be
classified into three distinct categories to provide a coherent framework for understanding
how movement behaviours emerge during performance (see diagram below).31
Figure 1: Newell’s model of constraints depicts how individual performer, task, and environmental
constraints all interact to channel behaviour (adapted from Newell, 1996).
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INDIVIDUAL PERFORMER CONSTRAINTS
Individual performer constraints refer to the existing structural characteristics of the individual,
such as height, body mass composition; and, the functional characteristics such as neural
paths in the brain, emotions, fatigue, injury status, etc. Such unique characteristics represent
resources that are brought to bear on the task problem or limitations that lead to individual-
specific adaptations by the performer.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
Many environmental constraints are physical in nature and include energy flows such as
sound (the auditory information available to the performer), temperature or the ambient light
in a performance context. Gravity is a key environmental constraint on movement coordination
in all tasks. Of course, some environmental constraints are social rather than physical. Socio-
cultural factors are key environmental constraints including family support networks, peer
groups, financial rewards, societal expectations and values as well as cultural norms.
TASK CONSTRAINTS
Task constraints are usually more specific than environmental constraints and include goals,
rules of a sport, implements or tools to use during performance, pitch and boundary markings,
augmented information sources and other instructional aids such as video. Adaptive learning
allows athletes to cope with novel task constraints as performance conditions change.
It needs to be emphasised that the interaction of the main classes of constraints on the
neuromuscular system during goal-directed activity results in the emergence of optimal
behaviours. For example, how a basketball dribbler decides to act in a 1 v 1 sub-phase depends
on relevant constraints at any one time, including the information available on court, current
fitness levels, physiological status, the nature of the practice surface, and intentions (e.g., to
score points quickly or to maintain possession of the ball). To summarise so far, skilled
behaviour can be characterised as movements that are flexible yet robust to changing
environmental forces. Movement solutions evolve over time as a consequence of the
constraints on system behaviour in any given context.
To further summarise so far, it is clear that attractors act like ‘magnets’ for the behaviour of
the many dynamic parts of the whole system. They represent ‘attractive’ functional states for
a system to settle into. In intentional movement systems, these states are functional in the
sense that they are formed to achieve a desired goal. Individual elements of the system
spontaneously ‘enslave’32  or attract other components so that, typically, large amounts of
symmetry emerge in system behaviour. Self-organisation in dynamical systems theory
emphasises the interaction between different levels of a system: the microscopic (or small
scale) and the macroscopic (or large scale). Movement patterns at a macroscopic level
spontaneously emerge from non-linear interactions (or the dynamics) of various components
at a more microscopic level of organisation. As we noted, discontinuous changes in
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macroscopic order, induced by the continuous scaling of a control parameter, are called phase
transitions, and are based on a symmetry-breaking process, where the current organisational
state of a biological system is disrupted, leading to a dramatic change in system structure.
To consider an example from dribbling in ball games, a player who dribbles past an opponent,
near a goal area in hockey, creates an irreversible process (i.e., a symmetry break). In order to
facilitate this transition, the attacker has to de-stabilise the current state of system organisation
(i.e., being further from the goal than the defender) until he or she can dribble past the
defender, changing to a new state where he or she is approaching the goal. Thus decisions
are embedded in an environment, embodied in a body and embrained in a brain.33  This
notion is further explored in sport.
EMBODIED DECISIONS
In football, Gréhaigne and colleagues argued that changes in the momentary configuration
of the game have to be examined in the light of the previous configurations.34  This way, each
game is a unique phenomenon, “reducing the efficiency of ready-made motor or strategic
solutions”.35  A consequence of a dynamical systems analysis of team ball sports is that it
becomes obvious that players reduce the ‘information-processing’ load by being sensitised
to particular aspects of the environment – aspects that have special significance because of
the tasks that characterises players’ activity. Practice should attune players to the variables
that reliably specify states of affairs that matter to a specific task.36   This way, players can
use the “situation as its own best model”37  and actively explore it, sampling it in detail at
specific locations according to the particular needs of the moment. This is in line with the
views of Gréhaigne et al., who concluded that: “With the opposition relationship, order and
disorder can emerge from the play at any moment. In this way, the energy and choices of the
players serve to create the conditions for transitions between configurations of play and thus
transform the play”38  (our emphasis). These transitions may be best understood in terms of
the interactions of multiple local factors (place of the players and of the ball, their speed,
player’s cognitions and morphology, the slipperiness of the floor, etc.). To focus on any one of
these parameters in isolation is to miss the valid explanation of performance, which consists
of understanding the interplay of forces in a way that eliminates the need to posit any single
controlling factor.39  Players’ embodied intelligence is fundamentally a means of using active
strategies that leave much of the information out in the world, and carefully using real-time
sequences of body-world interactions to solve problems in a robust and flexible way. The
image here is of coupled complex systems (e.g., a player and the environment) whose joint
activity solves the problem. In such cases, “it may make little sense to speak of one system’s
representing the other”.40
To exemplify these arguments we now refer to data from studies of the interaction of an
attacker and a defender in a 1 v 1 situation in basketball. According to Araújo and colleagues
we may consider the relative positioning of an attacker with the ball and a marking defender
near the basket.41  Such a 1 v 1 sub-phase of team ball sports is very common and can be
referred to as a dyad.42  The dyad formed by an attacker and defender, plus the basket,
comprises a system for the purposes of analysing decision-making behaviour. The aim of the
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attacker is to disrupt the stability of this system. When the defender matches the movements
of his or her opponent and remains in position between the attacker and the basket, the form
or symmetry of the system remains stable. When an attacking player dribbles past an opponent,
near the basket, he or she creates a break in the symmetry of the system. That is, symmetry-
breaking occurs as the previous stable interpersonal state transits to a new dynamic state.43
According to Araújo and colleagues, due to the dynamics of competitive ball games, there is
typically not enough information to specify a goal path completely in advance for attackers.44
Consequently, goal path selection, or decision-making in de-stabilising dyads formed with
defenders, can be viewed as an emergent process for attackers. A dynamical systems
interpretation of this transition process showed that the attacker-defender system exhibited
initial symmetry, which was broken during transition to a new state at a certain value of the
control parameter. Our analysis of the dynamics showed that the attacker was trying to break
system symmetry by dribbling past the defender, but the defender was attempting to maintain
the initial steady state. The attacker increased the variability of his dribbling actions in order
to augment the probability of emergence of the ‘decision when to go’. Suddenly (when the
symmetry was broken), the decision emerged in the “intending-perceiving-acting cycle.”45
Opposed to this, when the defender has the supremacy, the system maintains its symmetry
or stability.
Another study, in sailing, showed how the local environment plays a large role in selecting
behaviours.46  As we argued earlier, athletes’ decision-making is a means of using active
strategies that leave much of the information out in the context, and carefully using real-time
sequences of body-world interactions to solve problems in a robust and flexible way. Solutions
emerge from this interaction of performer and contextual constraints. The purpose of a sailing
regatta can be described as attempting to obtain the best use of the available wind to arrive
at the finish line as quickly as possible. This goal must be obtained through performance
manoeuvres that aim to control the direction and the speed of the boat. According to regatta
rules, five decreasing minutes before the start sailors initiate the so-called ‘starting procedures’
in order to be in the best position at the starting line (‘second zero’). This position is selected
according to wind shift tendencies and the actions of other boats. Araújo (et al.)’s (in press)
interpretation identified a phase transition phenomenon in the decision ‘where to start’
according to the manipulation of the angle between the wind direction and the line. These
findings suggest that decision-making in sports like sailing is an emergent embodied process.
However, we think that it is important to remember that dynamical systems explanations can
be arbitrarily far removed from facts about the real internal structure and processing of the
agent. It tells us how the values of the parameters of the system evolve over time, not what it
is about the way the system itself is constituted that causes those parameters to evolve in
the specified fashion. But we should understand something of how the larger-scale properties
are rooted in the interactions of the parts. To really understand a complex phenomenon it is
at least necessary that we understand something of how it is rooted in the more basic
properties of its biologically or physically proper parts. What this ultimately requires is
continually probing beyond the level of collective variables and the like so as to understand
the deeper roots of the collective dynamics themselves.47  This can be done only if we clearly
understand the constraints implied in the emergence of embodied decision-making.
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HOW CONSTRAINTS INFLUENCE BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE OVER DIFFERENT TIME
SCALES
We conclude this article by discussing how changing constraints shape emerging behaviour
in dynamical movement systems. It is clear that a particular set of interactions of an individual
performer, environment, and task over time can produce a particular function of behavioural
change. Newell’s model describes how emergence in movement systems occurs, and it was
argued that “the relative impact of these three categories of constraint on the pattern of
coordination varies according to the specific situation.”48   We can visualise how their relative
impact changes with time in Figure 2. Here we can see how constraints are channelling the
system to define the goal’s path.
Figure 2: The relative impact of constraints on the evolving system dynamics
According to Newell, “Environmental constraints are generally recognised as those constraints
that are external to the individual performer. Any constraint on the performer-environment
interaction that is not internal to the individual performer can be viewed as an environmental
constraint”.49   However, task constraints are a specific set of environmental constraints.
Following a similar reasoning we can consider that the functional constraints (as opposed to
structural constraints) of the individual performer, since they are more time dependent, are
the ones that should be progressively tuned to task goal. As Newell argued, “It is clear that a
variety of individual performer constraints converge to specify the appropriate pattern of
coordination”50  (our emphasis) and that, “Environmental constraints reflect the ambient
conditions for the task, whereas the focus of task constraints is the goal of the activity and
the specific constraints imposed”51 (our emphasis). So, the more defined the goal path, the
more the functional constraints and the task constraints specify the emergent behaviour. In
seeking solutions to behavioural task goals, the performer is attempting to discover the
dynamic characteristics of the system, where the system is defined over the individual
performer, environment, and task.
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We will end by using an example from sport to illustrate emergent decision-making processes
in dynamical movement systems. When a soccer player is at home before the game,
environmental constraints will have a dominant impact on the athlete, but when he or she is
at the ground preparing to perform a penalty kick, task constraints are much more influential.
The cultural and social constraints are more influential over a long range than the relative
position of the ball and the goalkeeper. During the beginning of his or her career, the structural
constraints of the player are very influential in the emergence of control, coordination and
skill. But during a competitive game it is his or her level of fatigue, emotional state, and other
functional constraints that will be most influential for achieving the movement goal of scoring
the penalty kick.
This reasoning reveals a new way of looking at decision-making in sport. It is new because,
contrary to the traditional computational approach that places all the complexity of the problem
into internal states of the individual performer,52  a constraints-led approach to intentionality
and decision-making tends to distribute the complexity over both the individual performer
and the environment.53  Also, the literature suggests that it may be possible to answer questions
that a theory of embodied decision-making must address:
When (and where) will decision-making happen?
What effect does expertise have on decision making?
What factors determine how large those effects will be?
The theoretical analysis of how embodied cognition can be captured in a dynamical systems
theoretical framework on decision-making in sport is in its infancy, but it is becoming clear
that concepts such as affordances, body-scaling of actions, fluctuations in movement through
exploration, and symmetry-breaking in order to seek phase transitions are potentially useful
ideas from an ecological approach that need to be investigated in future research. These,
and many other issues, are likely to form the basis of a theoretico-practical programme of
work on embodied decision-making from a constraints-led perspective for many years to come.
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